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mergers and the number of mergers. The results from logistic and count data regressions 
suggest that growth opportunity, concentration and cash flow are important determinants 
of merger activity. However, unlike existing studies, no evidence is found to support the 
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Key words: Mergers, Acquisitions, Occurrence, Logit Regression, Count Data 
Regression, Poisson Distribution, Frequency, Emerging economy, India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Corresponding Author 
 DETERMINANTS OF MERGER ACTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA 
 
1. Introduction  
It has been widely documented that many Asian economies have witnessed dramatic 
increase in merger activity since the mid 1990s (see e.g. Chen and Findlay, 2003). In 
India, the post liberalization era (i.e. after May 1991) has been characterized by a surge in 
corporate restructuring activity. In the first half of 2005, merger activity in the industry 
formed 88% of all corporate deals in India as compared to 67% in the previous year.
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Between January and June 2004 alone, a total of 277 deals valued at $6 billion were 
completed. This heightened activity and the critical role played by mergers in the growth 
of Indian industries makes it important to understand the features of merger activity 
especially because it can give us important insights into corporate restructuring in 
emerging economies. In this respect, we examine the role of various industry-level 
factors which explain incidence and frequency of mergers and acquisitions in India.  
 
While previous studies have explored the determinants of mergers, most of these focus on 
developed economies (see for instance, Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al, 
2004; Harford, 2005). However, merger occurrence, intensity and overall importance of 
merger activity varies substantially across countries, depending on factors such as 
corporate governance mechanisms, size and structure of the capital markets, importance 
of banks and other sources of capital, legal structures, tradition etc. Therefore significant 
differences can be expected to exist between countries in terms of merger motives, 
merger activity and also in its economic consequences. Due to these reasons, there is a 
need to supplement the current literature on mergers in developed countries with 
evidence from emerging economies. It is therefore interesting to understand what 
motivates merger activity in an emerging economy like India which has only lately begun 
adopting such corporate practices following recent changes in its legal and economic 
frameworks.  
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 Source: INDATA survey conducted by India Advisory Partners, available at 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/08/12/stories/2005081200541100.htm 
 Most studies on determinants of mergers have used investment in mergers (which is a 
continuous variable) to proxy merger activity which is then taken as the dependent 
variable in a regression framework (e.g. Andrade and Stafford, 2004). However it may be 
argued that the question of why firms choose to invest in acquisitions can be better 
answered by looking at the actual decision in terms of occurrence and frequency of 
mergers rather than the value. For this reason it is important to investigate the 
determinants of merger occurrence and the frequency of these occurrences. In this paper 
we differ from the existing literature by examining the motives behind the decision of 
firms to go for acquisitions which we proxy by the occurrence of a merger (which is a 
qualitative variable) and by the number of mergers that occur in an industry (which is a 
discrete variable). This requires us to employ logistic and count data regression models 
instead of standard regression methodology which has been mostly used in the literature. 
 
Thus, our work attempts to contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we 
provide evidence from mergers in a developing country. Second, we examine the role of 
industry level variables on the occurrence of mergers using logistic regression models. 
Third, we demonstrate an interesting application of count data regression models to 
investigate the determinants of frequency of mergers. Fourth, we provide evidence that 
suggests that while mergers in India are driven by growth and consolidation motives, but 
in contrast with existing evidence for developed countries, Indian firms are reluctant to 
restructure when the industry faces shocks. The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 reviews some existing evidence on determinants of mergers. Section 3 
describes our data-set and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
results, which is followed by concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
2. Received Evidence 
Several studies have attempted to explain the motives behind merger activity, by 
examining factors at the firm level as well as at the industry level. Attainment of synergic 
benefits has frequently been found to be a significant merger motive. For instance, 
Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail (1998) examine 260 mergers in the US between 1963 
and 1996 and record significant net synergistic gains in non-conglomerate mergers and 
insignificant net gains in conglomerate mergers. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) find that 
a successful merger offer increases the combined value of the merged entity by an 
average of 7.4%. Another documented firm-level reason for mergers is efficiency. 
Rhoades (1998) investigates this motive through nine case studies of bank mergers in the 
US and finds significant cost cutting in all cases.  Four out of these nine mergers show 
clear efficiency gains relative to peers. Bruner (1988) examines excess cash and debt 
capacity as a motive for mergers and finds evidence to support the theory of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) that suggests that “slack-rich” bidders pair with “slack-poor” targets to 
create value.  
 
Apart from firm level explorations, there is evidence of merger waves occurring within 
industries suggesting that there are certain factors operating on an industry level that 
determine merger activity (Brealy and Myers, 2003). Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) 
report significant clustering of merger activity by industry and correlate these clusters 
with economic, regulatory and technology shocks in the industry. Studies by Mulherin 
and Boone (2000) and Andrade et al (2001) also confirm the presence of such waves. 
However, there are dichotomies in understanding the causes of such waves. Harford 
(2005) classifies these causes as neoclassical and behavioural. Under the neoclassical 
studies, an interesting work is that by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) who argue that 
technological changes lead to dispersion in Tobin‟s q and results in „high q‟ firms taking 
over „low q‟ firms in the industry. Another study is by Harford (1999) who shows that 
higher cash resources are associated with higher takeover activity. Amongst the studies 
attributing behavioural causes to merger waves is the work of Rhodes-Kropf et al (2004). 
This paper suggests that merger waves occur when the aggregate industry market 
valuation, measured as market to book value ratio, is higher compared to various 
estimates of true valuations. The authors note that these valuations could be both due to 
misplacements and actual presence of growth opportunities. 
 
In a recent paper, Andrade and Stafford (2004) determine motivating factors for mergers 
both at industry and firm levels. The authors investigate the economic role of mergers in 
the US by performing a comparative study of mergers and other forms of corporate 
investment at both industry and firm levels. They find that industry capacity utilization 
has opposite effects on merger and non-merger investments particularly during the 1970s 
and 1980s. While excess capacity drove industry consolidation through mergers, peak 
capacity utilization induced industry expansion through non-merger investment. This 
suggests that one mechanism through which mergers enable industry restructuring is by 
inducing exit in times of industry wide excess capacity. This phenomenon is reversed in 
the 1990s when merger intensity is found to be the highest in industries with strong 
growth prospects, high profitability and near full capacity. Moreover at the firm-level the 
paper finds that both merger and non-merger investments are positively related to the 
Tobin‟s q value of the acquirer. These results point towards an expansionary motive 
behind mergers. 
 
While most of the above papers have focused on explaining the value of merger deals or 
merger intensity, Hijzen et al (2005) is the only study that we know of that deals with the 
number of mergers. The paper investigated the role of trade-costs in explaining the 
number of cross border mergers in OECD countries. Our paper, on the other hand, studies 
the determinants of merger occurrence as well as the number of mergers in the industrial 
sector of an emerging economy, viz. India. Focusing on merger occurrence and frequency 
enables us to answer the questions of which industries are likely to experience mergers 
and what determines the number of merger deals. 
 
Empirical evidence on merger motives in India is scarce. Basant (2000) suggests that 
economic reform in the Indian economy has significantly reduced micro-economic 
rigidities and enhanced competitive pressures. In response, firms have undertaken 
corporate restructuring activity in order to retain competitiveness and increase their value. 
Beena (2000), in a study of Indian industries, records an overwhelming dominance of 
mergers between related firms (i.e. those belonging to the same group or management) 
even while there are signs of an increase in mergers between unrelated firms. In another 
study, Beena (2004) finds evidence of mergers within the same group with the motive of 
consolidation of control to protect against takeovers but does not find any role of 
efficiency-related parameters in determining merger activity in India. The author instead 
suggests a merger motive of growth in size by acquiring higher equity.  
 
The aforesaid discussion indicates that most studies examining merger motives have 
focused on merger intensity in developed countries and those on India have not formally 
tested for the importance of different motives. Our paper attempts to empirically examine 
the importance of different industry-level factors to explain merger activity. For this 
purpose we investigate the determinants of merger occurrence as well as merger 
frequency. In brief, our results point towards the importance of growth opportunity, 
concentration and excess cash in explaining merger activity in India. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Sample 
The main problem in conducting a study of mergers and acquisitions in India, as in most 
emerging economies, is the absence of a readily available database on mergers. For our 
purpose, we constructed a data-set of mergers in Indian industries during the period 2002 
to 2004 by compiling information from different sources. The Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI), which is the stock market regulator, makes it mandatory for listed 
firms to make public announcements of their mergers or acquisitions to the stock market. 
The publicly available Prowess database, maintained by the CMIE (Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy), records all such announcements. Therefore, in order to 
create our sample of mergers, we went by the list of all merger announcements during 
2002 to 2004 recorded in the Prowess database, and cross-checked each announcement of 
a merger or acquisition with media reports available on the internet. By following this 
process, we were able to arrive at a data-set comprising of 109 mergers during the period 
of 2002 to 2004. We used CMIE Industry classifications for aggregating the data into 
industry level information. Finally for each industry and merger case, we extracted the 
required financial information again from the Prowess database. Since there was more 
than one merger in some industries, we ended up with a sample of 83 industry level 
observations. 
 
Empirical Model and Variables 
In their study of industry-level determinants of mergers, Andrade and Stafford (2004) 
examined the degree to which merger intensity is related to factors such as industry 
growth prospects, shocks to industry structure and industry concentration. In our paper 
however, the focus is on the determinants of occurrence and frequency of mergers instead 
of the investment value. Hence in our regression framework, the industry level merger 
activity is studied in terms of two dependent variables:  
i. A categorical variable to denote whether or not mergers occur in an industry in a 
particular year (takes value 1 if a merger occurs and 0 otherwise). 
ii. A count variable to denote the number of mergers in an industry in a given year. 
As potential determinants of these variables, we computed several industry-level 
explanatory variables by using data from the Prowess database. These are presented in 
Table 1. 
(Table 1 here) 
 
We employ Tobin‟s q as an explanatory variable to investigate the role of mergers as 
investments, in line with the q-theory which suggests that all forms of investments should 
be positively linked with q. Though the q-theory is firm specific, we have extended it to 
the industry level analysis as growth prospect is typically common to an industry. Our 
measure of Tobin‟s q assumes that market value of debt is correctly captured by its book 
value, an assumption that is frequently used in empirical studies. In addition to the 
continuous Tobin‟s q variable, we also use a set of dummy variables to differentiate 
between high q, low q and medium q firms. The reason for using these dummy variables 
is that an alternative interpretation of the q-theory suggests a demarcation between 
industries that should go for merger investments based on growth prospects, and those 
that should not (Andrade and Stafford, 2004). Therefore, in each year we sort the 
industries on the basis of q, classifying the bottom third as „low q‟ and the top third as 
„high q‟, and then assign them dummy variables of the same name. 
 
Cash flow and sales growth also act as proxies for growth opportunity in the industry 
while industry concentration, as measured by the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index, acts as a 
proxy for the industry structure. We measure shocks to the industry by the differential of 
current sales growth and the median sales growth of the industry for the period under 
study. Using different combinations of these variables, we specify four different models 
to examine the importance of the above factors in determining mergers. These models are 
summarized in Table 2.
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(Table 2 here) 
 
Econometric Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, we consider two different dependent variables as our measures of 
merger activity. For each dependent variable, we estimate all the above four models using 
the appropriate econometric technique. These are explained as follows. 
 
Merger Occurrence: In this set of regressions, the dependent variable is the occurrence of 
merger in an industry captured by a dummy variable. Since this is a case of a binary 
dependent variable, we employ the logistic regression technique that models the 
probability of occurrence of mergers in an industry as follows: 
iiii ubXapp  )]1/(ln[  
where pi refers to the probability of a merger occurring in the i
th
 industry and Xi 
represents the determinants of merger activity. 
  
Number of Mergers: In this case, the objective is to model the frequency of occurrence of 
mergers in an industry. Therefore, the dependent variable is the number of mergers that 
occur in an industry. Since this is an integer and not a continuous variable, ordinary least 
squares regression will lead to biased, inefficient and inconsistent estimates (Cameron 
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 While these alternative specifications allow us to compare our results with previous studies (e.g. Andrade 
and Stafford, 2004), we also tried a variable for industry size (number of firms or total assets) in our 
estimations. Industry size can control for the possibility that a big industry may witness more mergers than 
others simply because it has more firms. All our results remain qualitatively unchanged with the size 
control, albeit with weaker significance owing to multi-collinearity, and are available on request. We 
choose to report the estimations without including size to enable comparison with Andrade and Stafford 
(2004). Moreover, size is highly correlated with Concentration as an industry with a large number of firms 
is likely to be less concentrated, thus causing multi-collinearity problems. Therefore, in our reported results 
where we do not include size, Concentration is expected to take care of any possible size factor as well. 
and Trivedi, 1998). Therefore we apply the econometric technique of count data 
regression to estimate the following model: 
 iii ubXaXYE )][  
 
where E[Y|X] is the conditional mean of the number of mergers and is assumed to be log 
linearly related to the explanatory variables. The choice of the distributional assumption 
for the dependent variable is made by a chi-square test of over-dispersion (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998) which leads us to use the Poisson distribution in our estimations. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Before estimating the relationship between merger activity and its industry level 
determinants, we present a descriptive overview of our data-set. Table 3 provides a 
summary of the merger activity across industries in our sample. Intensity of merger 
activity is measured by the book value of the merged entity expressed as a percentage of 
the total assets of the industry. We find that out of the 109 mergers occurring in Indian 
industries, bulk of the mergers have occurred in the chemicals industry and the financial 
services industry. However merger intensity has been highest in the petroleum industry 
followed by the computer hardware industry, which is not surprising given the presence 
of high value firms in these industries. 
(Table 3 here) 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
Figure 1 plots the year-wise distribution of merger intensity and number of mergers for 
all industries. The graph indicates that the overall merger intensity has been highest in 
2002 and has decreased since then, while the number of mergers has been the lowest in 
2003 and almost the same in 2002 and 2004. Moving on to the explanatory variables, 
Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients of the number of mergers each industry with 
the industry level factors. This table gives an indication of the nature of the relation 
between merger activity and the explanatory variables. It appears that Cash and Tobin‟s q 
are both positively related to the number of mergers. At a preliminary level, this result 
gives early indication of the role of mergers as investments and the positive link between 
mergers and growth opportunity. The negative correlation between mergers and 
concentration suggests that mergers occur with the view of consolidation in an industry 
and are therefore dependent on the value of the concentration index in the industry. Less 
concentrated businesses try to attain market power by merging entities. The negative 
relation of mergers with both shock and sales growth is surprising and suggests that firms 
in Indian industries do not use mergers as a means of restructuring but rather avoid such 
restructuring activity when shocks occur.  
(Table 4 here) 
 
We now move to the estimated relationships between merger activity and industry level 
explanatory variables. The estimates from the logistic regressions that model the 
occurrence of mergers are presented in Table 5. The coefficient of Cash indicates that 
merger activity in an industry is positively associated with cash flow but the effect is not 
statistically significant except for in model 4 where it is significant at the 10 percent 
level. This is in concurrence with previous studies (e.g. Andrade and Stafford, 2004) 
which suggest that higher cash flows lead to higher investment activity. The coefficient 
of Concentration in each model is negative and significant at conventional levels 
indicating that businesses undergo mergers to consolidate and hence incidence of mergers 
is high in a low concentration industry.  
(Table 5 here) 
 
The coefficient of Tobin‟s q is positive and significant in each of the models (although it 
is only weakly significant at 11 percent in model 4). This is in accordance with the q 
theory of investment. In other words, there is a higher likelihood of mergers occurring in 
an industry that has higher growth prospects, even though q may be unable to capture all 
the growth effects. On the other hand, the high q and low q dummy variables do not 
significantly impact merger incidence. The positive relation between merger occurrence 
and growth appears to get reinforced by the positive coefficients of Sales growth, which 
might capture some of the components of growth opportunity that is not covered by our 
definition of q. However the coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. An interesting difference with the results of Andrade and Stafford (2004) is the 
negative association that we find between Shock and occurrence of mergers. This appears 
to confirm our preliminary findings from the correlation analysis that firms in Indian 
industries shrinks away from investment activity in the form of mergers when facing a 
shock and wait for the shock to subside before going for a merger. This result might also 
imply that mergers are not undertaken as a restructuring activity to remove inefficiencies. 
 
Finally we examine the impact of industry level factors on merger activity in terms of the 
number of mergers in each industry. The results from count data regressions are 
presented in Table 6. The relations found earlier in the logistic regressions appear to get 
reinforced in the count data regressions. Cash has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the number of mergers. Thus, the more cash flows in an industry, the higher is 
the number of mergers undertaken for investment of the excess cash. Concentration again 
emerges as a significant determinant of mergers with its negative coefficients indicating 
that higher number of mergers occurs in industries which are more fragmented. These 
industries rapidly move towards concentration of sellers in the market by merging 
different entities. Therefore our results seem to suggest that industry structure plays an 
important role in determining merger activity. 
(Table 6 here) 
 
The coefficient of Tobin‟s q in each of the estimated models is positive but statistically 
significant only in model 4. Both Cash flow and Tobin‟s q being proxies for growth 
opportunity, our results strengthen the view that more mergers are undertaken if avenues 
of growth are more, hence supporting the expansionary role of mergers. Interestingly, 
Tobin‟s q turns out to be a significant determinant of merger frequency only when high q 
and low q firms are separately controlled for by using dummy variables. This suggests 
that continuity of the relationship between mergers and growth becomes prominent 
within groups of low-q, high-q and medium-q firms. Moreover, the emergence of the 
high-q dummy as a variable with positive and significant coefficient reinforces our 
previous findings on the expansionary role of mergers.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
The present study tries to contribute to the empirical literature on mergers by 
investigating merger motives in an emerging economy. An additional contribution of this 
paper is the modelling of occurrence and frequency of merger deals which can better 
capture the decision to go or not go for mergers, instead of modelling the value. By 
conducting logistic and count data regressions respectively for occurrence and number of 
mergers in an industry, we have examined the role of industry level variables in merger 
activity. The results highlight low concentration, high cash flows and high Tobin‟s q as 
factors that explain the occurrence and frequency of mergers in Indian industries. 
 
One implication of our results is that they suggest the roles played by mergers in India. 
These roles involve consolidating resources in fragmented industries and supporting the 
growth of industries that have the potential to grow. Thus our findings indicate the 
presence of firms in Indian industries who undertake merger activity to leverage the 
growth potential available to them. These results are in broad conformation with 
available evidence from developed economies. On the other hand, in contrast with 
Andrade and Stafford (2004), we find no evidence to support the role of mergers as a 
restructuring activity since in our case merger activity turns out to be negatively linked to 
industry shocks. This result appears to suggest that Indian firms are reluctant to go for 
mergers during periods of industry wide shocks. This may be an outcome of the fact that 
product market competition and corporate strategies are immature or nascent in recently 
deregulated economies. This makes the firms cautious and risk averse, as compared with 
the experiences in most of the developed world. 
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Figure 1: Merger Activity by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Variables used in the Model 
Variables Definition 
Tobin‟s q  [Book assets + Market equity-Book equity]/Book assets 
Cash Flow (Cash) EBDIT/Sales 
Sales growth [Sales(t)/Cpi(t)]/[Sales(t-2)/Cpi(t-2)] -1 
Shock Abs[Sales growth (t) - Median(Sales growth in all t)] 
Industry Concentration 
(Concentration) 
Sum[(Sales/Total industry sales)
2
] 
Note: Each of the variables has been taken for the acquiring industry and not the acquirer 
industry.  
 
 
 Table 2: Independent Variables in each of the Model under Investigation 
Model Independent Variables 
Model 1 Tobin‟s q, Cash, Concentration, Shock 
Model 2 Same as 1, but replaces Shock with Sales growth 
Model 3 Same as 1, but additionally uses Sales growth 
Model 4 Same as 3, but additionally uses high-q and low-q 
 
 
 
Table 3: Industry-wise Mergers in India (2002-2004) 
INDUSTRY Average Intensity of 
Merger Activity 
Total number of 
Mergers 
Automobile 0.024 5 
Chemicals 0.394 16 
Communication Services 0.233 3 
Communications 0.000 0 
Computer Hardware 6.863 2 
Construction 0.003 2 
Consumer Electronics 0.000 1 
Diversified 0.300 1 
Electrical Machine 0.010 1 
Electricity 0.000 0 
Financial Services 2.555 16 
Food & Beverages 0.183 11 
General Purpose Machinery 0.000 0 
Health Services 0.000 0 
Industrial Machine 0.134 1 
Information Technology 0.135 4 
Metals 1.909 7 
Mining 0.161 1 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.062 1 
Miscellaneous Services 0.000 0 
Non-Metallic Minerals 0.657 3 
Other Electronics 0.036 1 
Petroleum 8.434 5 
Pharmaceuticals 0.887 13 
Recreational 0.048 5 
Textiles 0.037 5 
Trading 0.080 4 
Transport Services 3.500 1 
 
 Table 4: Correlation of number of mergers in each industry with industry level 
variables 
Variable Number of Mergers 
Cash 0.21141 
Concentration -0.32236 
Sales growth -0.10939 
Shock -0.09688 
Tobin‟s q 0.098279 
 
 
 
Table 5: Results of Logistic Regression of Occurrences of Mergers on Industry 
Level Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
-0.3406  
( 0.6275 ) 
-0.3132  
( 0.6484 ) 
-0.2219  
( 0.7402 ) 
0.0564  
( 0.942 ) 
Cash 
1.7144  
( 0.2928 ) 
1.2129  
( 0.4286 ) 
2.3117  
( 0.1641 ) 
3.04323  
( 0.0813 ) 
Concentration 
-7.0087  
( 0.0593 ) 
-8.5115  
( 0.0269 ) 
-8.2820  
( 0.0323 ) 
-8.4517  
( 0.0206 ) 
Tobin's q 
0.7779  
( 0.0272 ) 
0.7603  
( 0.0285 ) 
0.6396  
( 0.0442 ) 
0.6664  
( 0.1115 ) 
Sales growth  
0.4155  
( 0.7227 ) 
3.3051  
( 0.1572 ) 
3.0530  
( 0.1757 ) 
Shock 
-0.7754  
( 0.4389 ) 
 
-2.1679  
( 0.1176 ) 
-2.1199  
( 0.1087 ) 
High q    
-0.5294  
( 0.4735 ) 
Low q    
-0.7393  
( 0.2642 ) 
AIC 1.3266 1.3335 1.3277 1.3570 
SC 1.4723 1.4792 1.5026 1.5902 
No. of Observations 83 83 83 83 
Note: The values reported in parentheses are the p-values based on Huber-White standard errors 
that are robust to misspecifications of the underlying distribution of the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Results of Count Data Regression of Number of Mergers on Industry Level 
Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
0.4712  
( 0.1569 ) 
0.4708  
( 0.1546 ) 
0.4699  
( 0.1602 ) 
0.3776  
( 0.1733 ) 
Cash 
1.6769  
( 0.0192 ) 
1.6738  
( 0.0141 ) 
1.6973  
( 0.0205 ) 
2.676  
( 0.0048 ) 
Concentration 
-7.7345  
( 0.0205 ) 
-7.8613  
( 0.0102 ) 
-7.7856  
( 0.0151 ) 
-7.4196  
( 0.0095 ) 
Tobin's q 
0.0434  
( 0.4596 ) 
0.0389  
( 0.5399 ) 
0.0393  
( 0.5354 ) 
-0.1702  
( 0.0288 ) 
Sales growth  
0.1328  
( 0.8916 ) 
0.2401  
( 0.848 ) 
0.1489  
( 0.8948 ) 
Shock 
-0.0105  
( 0.9838 ) 
 
-0.0984  
( 0.8751 ) 
0.0932  
( 0.8745 ) 
High q    
0.7335  
( 0.0210 ) 
Low q    
-0.493796  
( 0.2501 ) 
AIC 3.3600 3.3596 3.3834 3.2422 
SC 3.5057 3.5053 3.5582 3.4753 
No.of Observations 83 83 83 83 
Note: The values reported in parentheses are the p-values based on Huber-White standard errors 
that are robust to misspecifications of the underlying distribution of the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
